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Abstract 
This article presents the findings of interviews with representatives from the majority of EU 
data protection authorities in the context of the ongoing data protection reform process. It 
identifies commonalities between the authorities to the extent it is possible to speak about a 
EU DPA perspective, but also identifies areas of tension and disagreement as well as future 
intentions. The focus of the article is upon the impact of the data protection reform process on 
the way that these independent bodies, located in EU Member States will increasingly have to 
cooperate at an EU-level. Capturing these perspectives at this moment in the reform process 
provides insight into the process from a group of concerned stakeholders, but also insight into 
how these stakeholders are (re)positioning themselves, planning, and anticipating the impacts 
of the reform. 
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1. Introduction 
European Union Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) are independent authorities (with their 
own powers and responsibilities, and organisationally separate from Member State 
ministries
1
) with a supervisory role in relation to data protection. Within the EU, they 
primarily draw their authority from the national implementations of Directive 95/46/EC - the 
Data Protection Directive. Globally, DPAs (also known as privacy commissioners, data 
privacy agencies and privacy enforcement authorities
2
) play multiple roles, such as 
ombudsmen, auditors, consultants, educators, policy advisors and negotiators as well as 
conducting enforcement actions.
3
 The data protection legal regime in the EU is currently 
undergoing a reform process: The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the 
associated Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive are intended to reform and 
update the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive and replace the 2008 Framework decision.
4
 At 
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the time of writing, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council have adopted 
positions on the Regulation and have completed the trialogue negotiation process producing a 
compromise text that will be formalised over the coming months. The resulting adopted text 
is likely to have significant impacts for EU DPAs. These impacts are likely to be particularly 
significant on the way in which EU DPAs cooperate with each other in a number of registers. 
Networking and group formation amongst DPAs have been ongoing for some time
5
 and 
Europe is seen as a particular concentration of such activity, given the role of the Article 29 
data protection working party as a point of discussion and coordination, and the coming 
together of EU DPAs in events such as the Spring Conference, and the Berlin Group. 
Collaboration outside of enforcement provides opportunities for DPAs to increase their 
regulatory capacity and effectiveness in relation to globalised threats to privacy.
6
 However, 
the GDPR will place increased requirements for collaboration upon EU DPAs.  
Given their ambiguous position of organisations that are likely to be deeply affected by the 
GDPR; responsible for enacting elements of it; and likely to have at least some of their 
manner of working restructured by it, but at the same time having limited official input into 
its final form, the perspective of EU DPAs on the reform process is particularly relevant. 
Capturing these perspectives at this moment in the reform process provides insight into the 
process from a group of concerned stakeholders, but also insight into how these stakeholders 
are (re-)positioning themselves, planning, and anticipating the impacts of the reform. This 
article is therefore intended to contribute to the literature on the international relations of data 
protection authorities. Cooperation between DPAS has become the subject of a relatively 
small number of previous articles
7
, many of which engage with the extent to which there is an 
emerging field of interaction between these actors engaged in cross-border interaction, and 
the extent to which the development of multi-level governance can be identified. This article 
expands this picture with the perspective of EU DPAs themselves. Their perceptions, 
anticipated challenges, problematisations and how they construct past experiences will 
impact upon the development in practice of EU governmentality (regimes of shared practice 
operating in spaces beyond, around and between states
8
) around privacy and data protection 
post-GDPR.  
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The paper first provides an account of the interview methods deployed in this study, before 
examining DPA perspectives on the GDPR and its impacts upon cooperation, in particular, 
the consistency mechanism, the "one-stop-shop" principles, the European Data Protection 
Board, the trialogue process, and information sharing. It then examines DPA perspectives on 
cooperation frameworks more broadly, including the possibilities of structured systems for 
information exchange, sharing best practice, requests for assistance, the role of the European 
Commission, complaint handling, alerting tools and budgets for cross border investigations.  
The paper finds that DPAs anticipate a significant impact from the GDPR, particularly for 
their inter-EU cooperation. The GDPR is seen as likely to increase the need for cooperation 
and to structure the form that this cooperation will take. As the reform process is still ongoing 
there is ambiguity about the final text, but even beyond that DPAs anticipate they will need to 
conduct further work on the practical details of cooperation. DPAs are concerned to build 
upon positive existing cooperation and communication methods. Key challenges for DPAs 
include maintaining legitimacy, freedom of action and ability to determine their own 
strategies and methods, and ability to take what they see as appropriate measures, whilst 
maintaining coordination and consistency with their peers. Open debates include the extent to 
which the GDPR will effectively harmonise data protection across Europe, and which 
elements of strategic independence and national context will remain for DPAs. Further, the 
extent to which structured processes and common approaches are possible or desirable is still 
an open question, with different DPAs holding different positions. Language differences 
remain a key topic of discussion in these interviews, potentially exacerbated by the type and 
volume of communication required under the reforms.  
2. Methods 
A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior representatives of 
European Data protection authorities between April and May 2015. The authors interviewed 
27 representatives, covering nearly all Member State national DPAs, one German state DPA 
(Landesbeauftragter für Datenschutz) representative
9
 and the European Data Protection 
Assistant Supervisor. These interviews lasted between 30 to 75 minutes and were based upon 
an interview guide. When in-person (physically or by phone) interviews could not be 
arranged, due to language facility or time commitments or when requested by participants, 
the interview guide was provided to the participating DPA to be completed as a 
questionnaire. Participants were provided with initial information on the purposes and 
intended use of the interviews, and their desired level of attribution was identified at the start 
of the interview. Where circumstances allowed and participants were willing, the interviews 
were recorded and transcribed. Where this was not possible notes were taken by the 
interviewer. Interview participants were provided with a further opportunity to correct the 
summary of the interviews. 
The interview research process takes participants perspectives as valid perspectives, which 
can feed into a larger discussion. The interview is a "social event", based on interactions 
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10
 This means that even where there is potentially 
disagreement about factual issues, these perspectives are meaningful for the DPAs involved. 
The semi-structured approach allows for flexibility and adaptation to particular 
interviewees
11
, but also consistency across the six interviewers. As a semi-structured method 
was used, some DPAs offered opinions or perspectives on issues that were not anticipated in 
the interview protocol, and at this point it was not possible to confirm if other DPAs would 
have been in agreement or disagreement with this perspective. Where this is the case, it has 
been noted in the text. Where we refer to a "majority" of DPAs, we mean a simple majority 
(over 50 percent), whereas "most DPAs" refers to a large majority. "Nearly all" means there 
were perhaps one or two dissenting positions, and in these circumstances this has been 
highlighted. "Some DPAs" is used where more than one or two DPAs expressed a position, 
but it was not commonly encountered in the interviews. 
3. The GDPR and its impacts upon cooperation 
The proposed General Data Protection Regulation will make some forms of cooperation 
between European DPAs a requirement. A key element is included under the duties and 
powers of supervisory authorities, Article 52, section 1c, which requires that the supervisory 
authorities "share information and provide mutual assistance to other supervisory authorities 
and ensure the consistency of application and enforcement of this Regulation" In particular 
Chapter VII on Co-operation and Consistency contains articles on lead authorities (Article 
54a in the Parliament version), mutual assistance (Article 55), joint operations of supervisory 
authorities (Article 56), the consistency mechanism (Article 57). The interviewers asked 
participants what impact they envisaged that the passing of the GDPR, and particularly those 
provisions directly related to cooperation, would have upon their ability to cooperate and co-
ordinate with other DPAs. 
Most DPAs anticipated a significant, strong impact from the passing of the GDPR in general, 
and particularly for cooperation between European DPAs. The stance of many DPAs towards 
the GDPR was optimistic, although often balanced with some caution, or a recognition of 
additional work that needed to be done, and pending issues that would need to be resolved. 
Several expressed a feeling of hope in relation to the Regulation. There were however some 
divergent opinions highly sceptical about the GDPR. Participants reminded us that 
cooperation between European DPAs was already ongoing through a number of informal 
mechanisms, and in general this was seen positively, although some participants identified 
some frustrating experiences they wished to improve (examples included processing 
communications in minority languages and differences in strategy). All DPAs recognised the 
need for increased collaboration within the European Union. Several DPAs informed us that 
they expected the drive to more frequent cooperation would come primarily from both 
European citizens and business, who would, under the GDPR, have increased expectations 
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about cooperation and consistency from their interactions with European DPAs, and that this 
would increase the onus upon DPAs to cooperate. DPAs expected the number of overseas 
complaints to increase, although this was dependent upon the particular context of the 
individual DPAs, in relation to their national environment and their relationship with their 
peers. The presence or absence in a jurisdiction of large multinational corporations engaged 
in the processing of cross-border data was seen as a significant determining factor in the 
extent and direction of cross-border complaints. It was suggested that they anticipated that 
European cooperation would become increasingly routine, and part of the "daily life" of EU 
DPAs. Other DPAs suggested that increased cooperation would, over time, smooth out and 
routinise interactions between DPAs, and building upon successful examples and interactions 
would help to create a culture of cooperation which could improve over time. Additionally, It 
was suggested that the obligation to cooperate under the GDPR could potentially provide 
additional weight to requests for cooperation. In general, DPAs believed that increased 
cooperation under the GDPR would bring an increased administrative burden and may raise 
resource and capacity issues. Although positive remarks were made by DPAs about the 
GDPR, one DPA expressed a divergent critical perspective stating that the legal basis of the 
GDPR would be challenged in the Court of Justice of the EU, and that it would be difficult 
for small DPAs to implement some of the cooperation mechanisms. There were also concerns 
that the role of "concerned DPAs" might slow down or potentially block decisions.  
Issues to be resolved, and where further work was anticipated, included technical and 
administrative mechanisms (the actual process of collaboration under the GDPR) and 
implementing acts, but also the spirit and attitude towards cooperation. The need to find a 
systematic solution to the issue of multiple working languages was raised by several DPAs. 
DPAs pointed out that the GDPR would not regulate all forms of cooperation. A number of 
DPAs offered information on the measures they were taking to prepare for the passing of the 
GDPR, including actions they would have to take in the leading period after the Regulation 
was passed, but before it came into force. Other DPAs were waiting for the text of the 
Regulation to stabilise before putting adaptive measures into place. 
3.1 The consistency mechanism 
The "consistency mechanism" would be established by Article 57. According to the European 
Commission, the mechanism is part of a new system for supervision of organisations 
processing personal data in one or more EU Member States or with a pan-EU impact. It is 
intended to "ensure coherent application of the rules" and "combines an advisory role for the 
European Data Protection Board and a role for the Commission".
12
 The basic principles of the 
mechanisms are that DPAs take decisions on cases without an EU-wide impact; where there 
is an EU impact the European Data Protection Board is engaged and issues an opinion (based 
on a simple majority). The consistency mechanisms also includes provisions on decisions 
regarding reasoned objections between DPAs , non-compliance with requirements for mutual 
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assistance to be reported to the EPDB, on individual cases and on matters of general 
consistency. 
The DPAs had a range of perspectives upon the consistency mechanism. Some DPAs were 
unwilling to comment on the consistency mechanisms until discussion in the Council and the 
trialogue had concluded. It was described by one DPA as "the best possible compromise" and 
a key source of the need for DPAs to improve their regular communication.  
Some DPAs expressed doubt about the mechanism. Particular concerns included uncertainty 
about how the mechanism would work in practice, the risk of multiple interpretations of the 
mechanism, the speed of the envisioned process, the clarity of the rules, and in particular the 
complexity of the current workflow and how this would be understandable by both DPAs, 
and more significantly, by EU citizens and data controllers. Elements of the consistency 
mechanism that were seen as needing some work included the integration of the mechanism 
at the levels of citizens and the time limits for decisions.  
A small number of DPAs expressed the need to limit the function of the consistency 
mechanism to only those cases with a cross-border component. This was linked both to the 
administrative burden of the mechanism, but also the more political concern of the DPA 
losing discretion (including discretion to enforce) and leaving room for the effects of national 
legislation (such as that on access to public documents and transparency laws). There were 
mixed opinions regarding negotiations in the context of the Working Party on Information 
Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX).  
3.2 The One-Stop-Shop 
Related to the consistency mechanism, the GDPR proposes a "One stop shop" principle, in 
which only one DPA is responsible for taking legally binding decisions against a company, 
with that DPA being determined by the company's main establishment in the European 
Union.
13
 The aim of the one-stop-shop principle is to ensure consistent application, legal 
certainty and reduce administrative burdens.  
A key concern raised by a minority of DPAs in relation to the One-Stop-Shop principle was 
the risk of "forum shopping" on the part of data controllers. It was suggested that controllers 
might try to avoid enforcement by locating their main establishment in countries with a less 
onerous enforcement approach. More broadly, several DPAs expressed concern that the one-
stop-shop principle should be framed in such a way that it focused upon the exercise of data 
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protection rights by European citizens, and facilitated the ability of citizens to file complaints 
in their home jurisdictions. It was suggested that although the model looks potentially 
complex, this complexity will not be a concern of the citizen or data subject, but rather be 
handled by the authorities involved.  
Challenges related to this principle include communication with citizens and explaining how 
the principle works and how they can best use it to exercise their rights. Concerns were again 
expressed regarding language and interpretation requirements (particularly when DPA 
decisions are challenged or go to court proceedings, which then might have to be conducted 
across linguistic divides). In a similar manner to the consistency mechanisms, DPAs 
expressed concerns about the one-stop-shop in relation to jurisdiction disputes and 
complaints against controllers offering services in only one country, and the ability of 
appealing against DPA decisions to judges based in foreign countries.  
The one-stop-shop principle is an area where several DPAs stated that they were paying close 
attention to ongoing discussions and dialogue, and some stated that more recent versions of 
the principle were regarded as more clear, and less problematic than earlier versions. In spite 
of this, DPAs did express concerns about the practical implementation of the principle.  
3.3 The European Data Protection Board 
The interviewers asked DPAs for their perspective upon the proposed European Data 
Protection Board, its implications for cooperation between European DPAs and the impact of 
the shift from the existing Article 29 Data Protection Working Party to the Board. DPAs 
expressed some uncertainty about the role, responsibilities, powers, legal standing, and 
internal decision-making processes of the Board. Discussions on the nature of the EDPB were 
seen as still ongoing.  
A general perspective was that the EDPB would be a positive development. Cooperation 
under the Article 29 Working Party seemed to be generally well-regarded and DPAs were 
generally seeking to build upon this. However, some DPAs were cautious about losing some 
of the strengths of the existing model in the transition to a new way of working.  
Coordination, communication and conflict-resolution between DPAs were identified as key 
roles for the Board. The EDPB was seen as having an increased practical role in relation to 
handling individual cases. Some DPAs saw an additional role in dealing with the equal 
implementation of the GDPR across Member States. These tasks were seen as adding to the 
workload of the EDPB in comparison with the Article 29 Working Party, and as having 
potential resource implications. The EDPB was seen by one DPA as introducing collective 
decision making for DPAs, in addition to the formulation and expression of collective 
opinion, as through the Article 29 Working Party.  
That the EDPB would have legal personhood, and the ability to issue binding decisions was 
seen as positive by DPAs. Internal decision making in the board raised the issue of how 
decisions, the number of which were anticipated to increase with the increased practical (in 
addition to advisory) role of the board, would be handled. Unanimous decision making was 
seen by some DPAs as too cumbersome, and would lead to unworkable blockages. Instead, 
they advocated majority decision making, although all DPAs who commented on this 
stressed the need for consensus building efforts and time for discussion. However, several 
DPAs stated that it was important to achieve a balance between the powers of the Board and 
the autonomy of national DPAs, as there could be tensions there. The role of the EDPS as the 
secretariat of the board was questioned, and compared with the potential for the Board to 
have been constructed as an Independent Agency. Several DPAs commented on the issue of 
the EDPB having its own budget, with sufficient resources for the various tasks that would be 
attributed to it. One DPA raised the issue of how the Board would integrate or operate in an 
international environment, with an increasing number of bodies having some regulatory role, 
or policy interest in data protection.  
Several DPAs emphasised possible implications related to the establishment of the EDPB that 
would occur at national level. German DPAs, for instance, raised the issue of how to 
determine voting rights for German DPAs at the state level within the EDPB, an issue which 
is currently in discussion amongst the affected parties through the German Conference of 
Data Protection Commissioners. 
3.4 The Trialogue 
The interview participants were asked if they had any perspective on issues that the collective 
body of DPAs or individual authorities should attempt to feed into the Trialogue
14
 discussion 
process between the Commission, Council and Parliament before the GDPR could be 
finalised.
15
 Several DPAs deferred on this question, citing a division (either explicitly 
constitutional or conventional) between lawmaking and enforcement roles, which placed the 
negotiation process in the hands of Member State representatives. However, the Article 29 
Working Party was seen as observing the process, and in a potential position to feed those 
perspectives shared by DPAs into the Trialogue following a decision by the Council. The 
working party has subsequently issued such a position reiterating the need that reforms not 
lower the protections for European citizens.
16
 Another DPA informed us that there is clearly 
scope for DPAs to feed into this process as stakeholders by expressing views to their national 
governments. 
3.5 Information sharing 
The proposed GDPR would require DPAs to share “relevant” information with each other. In 
particular, they face a requirement under Article 52 of the Parliament version to "share 
information with and provide mutual assistance to other supervisory authorities", and a 
requirement for lead authorities to communicate relevant information to concerned authorities 
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in particular cases, and a requirement under Article 55 in relation to providing information to 
each other relevant to mutual assistance.  
We asked the DPAs how their offices would determine what was “relevant” information. 
From the interviews, DPAs broadly understood the necessity of sharing information with 
their European peers, and that this would likely increase in some manner under the GDPR. 
Several DPAs told us about the various fora in which they shared information with their 
European peers, in particular the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party and its various 
sub-groups. Many other fora were also positively mentioned.  
With regard to their current status, some DPAs informed us about their ability to share 
information. Information sharing was done primarily on an informal basis. In the context of 
the GDPR, some DPAs anticipated continuing with this approach.  
For the most part, DPAs suggested that they currently shared information as necessary, and as 
required for a particular case, in relation to the context of that case. There was therefore not a 
standard set of information that was exchanged in most cases. Relevancy was determined 
through contextual criteria, ranging from such as "all pieces of information that are useful in 
assessing the issue at hand" to "all relevant information need to take the appropriate 
procedural and material measures in order to solve a case" and "the information which we 
consider as necessary for adoption of a decision". Relevancy was determined by informing a 
DPA, with the possibility of negotiation and discussion if the receiving DPA felt there was 
some information missing.  
In the context of a case referred to another DPA due to the geographical location of a data 
controller, DPAs stated that they would pass on all information required for the investigation, 
but would expect to remain informed by the investigating DPA in order to be able to inform 
the data subject/complainant in turn.  
Some concerns were raised about the sharing of personal data between DPAs in the context 
of an investigation. Some DPAs identified legal barriers around confidentiality that prevented 
them from sharing information. Some DPAs identified restrictions on sharing information 
with DPAs outside the EU and that this was at least one factor in their non-participation in 
GPEN (the Global Privacy Enforcement Network, see below). However, others (who 
themselves did not identify a barrier) suggested that such concerns might be overstated and 
that in their experience, information that needed to be shared for cross-border investigations 
was generally not the personal data involved in the case, but rather information on the nature 
of the incident, circumstances, and the opportunities for cross-border working, including 
identifying the jurisdiction in which a data controller is located. However, some DPAs may 
be bound to secrecy according to national secrecy legislation, particularly in relation to 
functions of audit and inspection, that will not be altered by the passing of the GDPR. One 
DPA suggested that due to the GDPR (consistency mechanism and one-stop shop, and a 
EDPB with binding decisions) meaning that European DPAs would start acting as, in a 
certain sense, a "big, single DPA" that national level confidentiality requirements might have 
to be interpreted in this manner to allow sharing of confidential information within this 
group. Others suggested that the exchange of confidential case information between DPAs 
for cases with cross-jurisdictional elements was part of their operational procedure. DPAs 
stressed that the issue of sharing confidential information is still pending and awaiting 
resolution in the framework of the GDPR. Also, some DPAs underlined that in the meantime 
this has originated constitutional courts cases which are under judicial review.  
One DPA highlighted the need to keep information sharing to actual cross-border cases, and 
that in this context, the determinant of relevancy was the information required to bring about 
a cross-border resolution to a case. DPAs in general seemed very willing to share anonymised 
versions of their cases, post-investigation, and investigations with their peers, particularly in 
closed environments. 
4. Developing cooperation frameworks 
4. 1 Structured information exchange 
We asked DPAs if they would value a structured system for the exchange of information with 
other DPAs. If so, we asked about the requirements for such a system and what types of 
information would they be most interested to share. Opinion was somewhat divided on this 
perspective. Several DPAs reiterated that they were broadly supportive of the idea of sharing 
information with their European peers. In addition, several DPAs were supportive of the 
concept of a structured system for doing this. It was seen as useful, increasing efficiency and 
helpful for parties to understand each other better. 
Some DPAs expressed that a structured system of some form was a necessity. Drivers for the 
creation of a structured system for information exchange included the anticipated increase in 
information sharing and collaborative working arising from the GDPR, the pursuit of 
efficient modes of working, or the alternative of dealing with 29 different sets of practices, 
requirements and document templates. Several DPAs expressed that some form of structure 
for information exchange would be beneficial or convenient, and that this might reduce 
communication workloads by removing unnecessary communication. Such a system might 
include key categories of information and serve as a checklist or reminder for DPAs as to the 
types of information that are commonly needed, serve as an "outer limit" for focusing 
information, and prevent the "blur" of unstructured information. The types of information that 
DPAs anticipated sharing (or were seeking to gain access to) included plans and intentions, 
case law, decisions, experiences and best practices, informal thinking, opinions, and requests 
for opinions.  
Some DPAs were less supportive. The exchange of information through current 
"unstructured" methods was seen as adequate and the lack of a structured system was not the 
key barrier to DPA cooperation and coordination. Clever and well designed systems for 
information exchange would likely not harm DPA cooperation, but if their absence was not 
the key barrier or challenge, then they would have little positive impact. Even supporters 
acknowledge that a system would have to have significant flexibility in order to cope with the 
various ways that DPAs might have to work together and the diverse types of investigation or 
cases that they would have to deal with. This meant it would be difficult to specify in advance 
many elements of the structure. DPAs also acknowledged that there were limits on the types 
of information that could be shared. As with many other areas of coordination between 
DPAs, the issue of language was raised in this context: which language(s) would a structured 
information exchange system support? Active and ongoing translation would be an expensive 
cost.  
DPAs suggested that pre-agreement on the way that information would be exchanged would 
be necessary even in the absence of a formal structured system. One suggested that shared 
principles and purposes for communication and information exchange should be established 
between European DPAs before any form of technological solution was developed to support 
this.  
DPAs suggested potential ways in which a system might operate or sources of inspiration and 
learning for the design of such a system. These included: Some kind of dashboard 
functionality for understanding ongoing investigations, potentially based upon that developed 
by the Belgian DPA for the Google Spain judgement; the national intelligence model used by 
Interpol for sharing information on international criminal cases (appropriately adjusted for 
the activities that DPAs conduct) where shared intelligence is categorised and assessed under 
a number of categories; existing discussions between the Nordic states, virtual working space 
and collaboration tools; an internet database or extranet; and in one suggestion, that document 
templates, rather than any additional form of software or communication technology, would 
be the most appropriate solution.  
DPAs expressed mixed perspectives upon the existing tool the Communication and 
Information Resource Centre for Administrations, Businesses and Citizens (CIRCABC)
17
. 
One DPA felt that the tool was good, but that it was currently under-used. Others expressed 
doubts, particularly that the tool was not designed for this purpose, was not controlled or 
owned by DPAs, and was not integrated with the day-to-day workflows of any authority.  
Barriers to the use of any such system included that it was not a priority topic and would 
attract limited attention, logistical issues including financial and organisational barriers, legal 
barriers of various severity in national legislation, a limit upon sharing information outside of 
the EU, and the uncertainty that the GDPR would provide sufficient legal gateways around 
national limitations upon the sharing of confidential information. Such a system would also 
have to be more effective and efficient than the exchange of specific, focused email between 
individual officers in different DPAs. Such a system would need to pass an efficiency test, 
with many other competing priorities likely to overtake putting information onto a system 
that was too onerous to use. Even CIRCABC seems to suffer in this regard.  
4. 2 Sharing best practice 
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DPA interviewees were asked how they currently share information on best practice with 
other DPAs. The report "Co-ordination and Co-operation between Data Protection 
Authorities" from the first phase of the PHAEDRA project provided an overview of this 
area
18
, and the answers received to this question support the findings there. Sharing of best 
practice occurs through various mechanisms and forums, including international conferences, 
working groups, the case handling workshops and associated network, joint inspections and 
common audits, bilateral discussions, staff exchanges and visits, asking direct questions of 
other DPAs on topics of shared interest, task forces.  
DPAs identified different channels as being the best source for the exchange of particular 
types of intervention, in particular through the interaction of different types of specialist staff, 
for example Commissioners, lawyers, and IT experts. There is some doubling-up of networks 
(for example, the case handling network and the Article 29 Working Party have very similar 
membership).  
DPAs expressed clear appreciation for the willingness of their European colleagues to 
relatively freely exchange experiences in response to direct questions about experiences, 
positions and activity from their peers. DPAs acknowledged that the experiences and 
decisions of their peers needed to be understood in the context of national contexts and in 
particular in light of national legislations, but several DPAs said that they gained very 
valuable perspectives from these exchanges. In addition, some DPAs stated that they 
preferred to share these experiences in interactive sessions with their peers, where questions 
could pass back and forth and details be discussed.  
4.3 A standardised EU approach to "requests for assistance" 
DPAs were asked their opinions on desirability and feasibility of standardising the way that 
DPAs approached their European counterparts with requests for assistance. Several DPAs 
stated that such a standardised approach was a necessity. Others expressed that a standardised 
approach to the presentation of requests for assistance would be useful and that it could 
facilitate cooperation and coordination. A standardised approach might allow DPAs to make 
better informed decisions about the requests being presented to them, and allow for clearly 
setting the parameters of any joint or transferred investigation and for organising the division 
of work (based upon, for example technical or investigative experience), as well as increasing 
the speed and efficiency of communication. The awareness that similar procedures were 
being followed was seen as useful. Others contextualised this form of operational cooperation 
against a background of global data protection issues that did not follow national borders, and 
the need to provide high quality and effective services to both data subjects and data 
controllers.  
Any standardised approach to requests for assistance was seen as needing clear and simple 
rules, to be agreed collectively by EU DPAs, and finding a resolution to several practical 
issues, particularly in relation to language and translation. Such a system, we were told, 
should also retain some space for information that did not fit within the structure, but that 
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nevertheless needed to be exchanged as part of a request. The approach must therefore have 
some capacity to respond to the particular nature of a case. Standardised templates for 
requests for assistance would have to be well developed, and if so, they would serve as a 
reminder to include appropriate information. Information that was identified as an appropriate 
part of such a structured approach included the subject of the complaint, the technical 
circumstances, any other data subjects affected by the breach, and involvement of an IT or 
manual system. However, some DPAs suggested that it was the attitude to cooperation that 
was most important, regardless of the approach or template used in practice. 
One perspective was that the current system of bilateral requests, often formal written memos 
from one DPA to another, worked acceptably well for the relatively low volume of cross-
border complaints received by DPAs. Some DPAs provided details of the Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoU) that they had established with particular peers, which provided some 
structure to their interaction and cooperation. One DPA expressed concern that a standardised 
approach might actively hinder and limit cooperation and communication that was already 
occurring in less formal ways.  
It was suggested by one DPA that it could be useful to take the Google Spain judgement 
recommendations of the Article 29 Working Party as a reference model
19
. DPAs provided 
examples of systems in different fields that could be used as examples and inspiration for 
data protection. These included the field of asylum claims, the system for passing on fines for 
violations of traffic rules between different EU states, criminal law cooperation in the 
Council of Europe, and the well-established tradition of mutual legal assistance. These 
systems were not seen as perfect, but sufficiently functional to learn from. 
4.4 The role of the European Commission 
DPAs were asked what role (if any) would they want to see the European Commission take in 
the development of a co-operation framework for DPAs, and if coordination should be a DPA 
“leadership role”. The majority of DPAs interviewed suggested that the leading role in 
cooperation and coordination between data protection authorities should be played by the 
authorities themselves, in order to maintain their independence and effectiveness. DPAs were 
also seen as the site of knowledge and experience on cooperation and on enforcement. This 
extended to the development of specific frameworks and methodologies for cooperation 
between them. Coordination between DPAs was seen as best occurring through bilateral or 
multilateral arrangements between the DPAs themselves, including the Article 29 Working 
Party and EDPB, whilst DPAs were seen as the actors who would have to prose and develop 
any cooperation framework they would use.  
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In particular, the European Commission was seen as having no competence in data protection 
enforcement. The role of the European Commission was therefore, for the most part, seen as 
facilitating activity by the DPAs, through the provision of resources, and tools. In this context 
there was criticism of the number of delegated acts foreseen in the GDPR, and another 
anticipated that the passing of the GDPR would increase the influence and powers of the 
Commission in this area. Some DPAs saw a role for the Commission in detailing 
implementing acts of the Regulation. 
Suggested activities that the Commission could undertake to better support cooperation and 
coordination between DPAs included the provision of language support and translation 
services, the provision of research and background information, technical infrastructure (as 
with CIRCABC), technical assistance, support for an alerting tool, administrative tools. 
Support from the Commission was seen as potentially important during the leading period 
between the Regulation passing and it coming into force. According to several DPAs support 
from the Commission should be requested by the DPAs as required. One DPA did suggest 
that the Commission might have some role in developing standard forms and templates, in 
multiple languages. Another suggested that the Commission might be able to play a role in 
evaluating the extent to which different DPAs met the various requirements of Regulation, 
and could express opinions on the extent to which DPAs had sufficient IT resources and 
human resources. This authority also suggested that the Commission had a role to play in 
observing and coordinating on international political issues (such as trans-Atlantic 
discussions about Passenger Name Records) which are more political than they are legal or 
judicial, and maintaining awareness. Neither of these DPAs saw a role for the Commission in 
day-to-day cooperation or work of DPAs. 
In discussing leadership roles more broadly, DPAs raised the issue of "lead DPA" in 
investigations,
20
 and the way in which the EDPB could play a role in determining lead DPA 
and main establishment when there were disagreements. 
4.5 Common approach to complaint handling 
The interviewers asked the DPAs if they considered the development of a common EU 
approach to complaint handling to be desirable and feasible. Several DPAs expressed support 
for a common approach to complaint handling, believing that it was both necessary and 
desirable. Some DPAs expressed the belief that a common approach to complaint handling 
would be the eventual result of the GDPR, as these provided a drive towards harmonisation. 
Particularly the one-stop-shop and consistency mechanisms were seen as driving towards 
harmonisation in complaint handling in order to treat European citizens fairly and to deal 
with increasing international complaints.  
Others were significantly more cautious. Some were concerned about independence and over-
regulation of their activities, and believed a common approach would require careful 
consideration. The GDPR was described as having made the decision to retain national 
DPAs, who had to interact in specific national contexts, preventing the possibility of a 
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common approach. One DPA highlighted the multiple ways in which they could receive and 
accept a complaint (with about half not being received through their own standard forms). 
The complexity of any standardised process was also raised as a potential barrier. Several 
DPAs wanted to limit a common approach to complaint handling to cases with a cross-border 
element. Others suggested that sharing the results of complaint handling, and the process of 
learning from similarities and differences, would be more effective way to spend effort than 
trying to standardise the procedure.  
Even those DPAs who were supportive of a common approach (or believed it an eventual 
requirement) acknowledged the difficulty of reaching a common approach given the variety 
in DPA practice, administrative and other laws in different Member States, different 
requirements and competencies of DPAs, applicable deadlines, information sharing, sanction 
powers, and differences in culture and regulatory approach. They commented that such an 
approach would have to take into account and be sensitive towards these differences. 
Therefore, a common approach to complaint handling would, according to some DPAs, 
require additional clarification and harmonisation following the GDPR. One DPA suggested 
that it would first be necessary to understand how complaints are currently handled across the 
Member States, analyse these and identify models that are the best, or that could work in a 
better way. 
4.6 Alerting tools 
DPAs were asked if the Global Privacy Enforcement Network (GPEN)
21
alerting tool was 
sufficient for their communication and alerting needs or would they prefer to see another 
alerting tool, e.g., from the Article 29 Working Party (or EDPB) or from the International 
Conference of Privacy and Data Protection Commissioners? 
Several DPAs informed us that they did not participate in GPEN. For some this was a result 
of a legal requirement, for others it was a political matter (for example related to maintaining 
independence), and for a third group, they had not yet pursued membership. Several 
described a limited participation (participating in sweeps, but not becoming members, or 
using GPEN for exchange of knowledge and experience rather than organising cooperation, 
being a member but not participating in much activity because of their specific national data 
protection context). Amongst the non-members, there was awareness of the existence of an 
alerting tool, but some uncertainty about its functions and mode of operation.  
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Some of these DPAs expressed a preference for a tool without links to the United States 
(GPEN's information technology is provided by the US Federal Trade Commission) or other 
national control, and in this case an international or European body was the preferred host for 
an altering tool. GPEN was not seen as a sufficient stand in for European alerting 
mechanisms, even if more European DPAs would join. Others suggested that the emergence 
of parallel models with different membership, which could be alerted on particular issues of 
relevance was the best approach.  
Whilst some DPAs were a little sceptical about the benefits and capacity of the GPEN 
alerting tool, and warned us against reading too much functionality into something quite 
technologically simple (essentially the "alerting tool" is a newsletter function). Additionally, 
others suggested that most information exchange occurred through phone calls and face-to-
face discussions at conferences rather than through any structured tool, and that there was 
real benefit to this "coffee break" interaction, even if there was a need for formalisation of the 
organisation of cooperation. The simplicity of the GPEN method was seen as a potential 
positive aspect for some DPAs. Some were uncertain about the extent to which an alerting 
tool at the level of functionality that exists within GPEN might not just duplicate channels of 
communication which already exist within and between the members of the Article 29 
Working Party.  
Beyond GPEN DPAs provided examples of practice in consumer protection alerts, and 
informed us about the development of a cooperation framework within the Spring Conference 
and the creation of an Article 29 subgroup on enforcement cooperation. The latter was seen 
as a very positive step for increasing practical cooperation.  
There was general, if somewhat muted support for an EU equivalent of the GPEN alerting 
tool, although some DPAs were unsure about the nature of the GPEN tool, and the 
capabilities it offered. An alerting tool offered possibilities to some DPAs interviewed. This 
included improving communication in and around joint actions. DPAs with positive 
perspectives upon the GPEN tool spoke about the possibility of a parallel mechanism under 
the EU Regulation, and that both of these frameworks could potentially engage in mutual 
learning, and avoid reinventing the wheel. Other DPAs simply suggested they would use any 
effective tool that was developed.  
Some DPAs highlighted diversity, stating that they did not want to rely on a single alerting 
tool, and that access to multiple alerting processes might instead be beneficial. Other DPAs 
presented an opposed perspective, warning against the multiplication of fora and platforms 
resulting in a decrease in efficiency, with DPAs have to enter the same (or subtly different) 
information into several different platforms. These DPAs instead preferred a single 
harmonised platform for information exchange. Another stated that they would need to 
conduct an in-depth analysis to determine which are the best tools. It was suggested that the 
onus sat with the communicating party to assess how they needed to make any particular 
piece of information visible and who they wanted to see it.  
One DPA suggested that many of the cooperative activities anticipated under the GDPR 
(mutual assistance, the consistency mechanism, one-stop-shop and joined inspections) could 
be interpreted as alerting tools. Others suggested that such communication mechanisms 
would likely have to be developed to put the various provisions of the GDPR into practice.  
Requirements for an alerting tool that emerged during the interviews included: that it ideally 
be automated, quick, efficient, and contain the relevant information for an organisation to 
make informed decisions about if and how to cooperate. Barriers identified included the 
capacity and capability of organisations to respond to alerts, and the way that alerts might 
integrate (or not) with existing work practices within DPAs. 
4.7 Budgets for Cross border investigations  
DPAs were asked if they were asked to participate in an investigation by another EU DPA, 
would they have a budget for this? In this context we considered scenarios where a DPA 
might be asked to either provide information to an investigation (for example, investigating a 
local subsidiary data processor) or asked to take on the lead role in an investigation when a 
data controller’s main establishment was in their jurisdiction.  
Many DPAs said that participating in an investigation with or at the request of another DPA 
would not pose a budgetary problem or that budgets would not pose an obstacle to 
responding to such a request. Some DPAs in this position highlighted other cooperation 
issues (for example coherence and consistency) as more significant than budgetary and 
financial considerations. Particularly, responding to requests for information or perspectives 
were not dealt with in terms of their budgetary implications.  
Other DPAs told us that their current budgetary arrangements did not contain any provision 
for cross-border or joint investigations. Some said that the budget could be found for such 
participation, but that it would require some re-prioritisation of other activities and therefore 
some careful consideration. Some DPAs anticipated shifting a proportion of their budget to 
explicitly cover such costs post-GDPR, but that such requests might currently cause a 
problem. 
Some DPAs told us about legal requirements as part of their foundational legislation that 
required them to investigate all complaints put to them, and that they therefore could not 
distinguish legally between a complaint put to them by a data subject, or an issue brought to 
their attention by a fellow DPA. In a similar manner, one DPA suggested that although there 
was no specific budget for coordination in this respect, they expected properly organised 
cross-border cooperation to actually reduce their investigating costs.  
DPAs did identify potential budgetary issues that would arise with the anticipated increase in 
cross-border cases under the GDPR. Some told us about their intention to seek an increased 
budget with the passing of the GDPR. The GDPR contains provisions (see Recital 94 and 
Article 47) that Member States should provide national DPAs with the resources necessary 
for cooperation, but DPAs expressed that the exact meaning of this, and how it would be 
interpreted by national governments was currently unclear (some DPAs were more confident 
than others in this regard). The question of some mechanism or agreement on cost sharing or 
reimbursement was raised, in order for larger and better resourced DPAs to support their 
smaller partners in investigations, as well as the possibility of recouping money from 
investigated data controllers (not yet finalised in the GDPR). Cross-border agreement on the 
distribution of any revenue from increase fines would also have to be achieved. Translation 
costs were identified as an element of cooperation costs.   
One DPA raised the issue of secondment efforts where a member of staff from one DPA 
might be seconded to another support of particular investigations, and that this would require 
an appropriate budget. 
5. Conclusions 
Most DPAs anticipated a significant, strong impact from the passing of the GDPR in general, 
and particularly for cooperation between European DPAs. The stance of many DPAs towards 
the GDPR was optimistic, although this was often balanced with some caution, or a 
recognition of additional work that needed (and needs) to be done, and pending issues that 
would need to be resolved. In general, DPAs believed that increased cooperation under the 
GDPR would bring an increased administrative burden and may raise resource and capacity 
issues. All DPAs interviewed recognised the need for increased collaboration within the 
European Union (which was seen by some as critical, given that a spirit or attitude of 
cooperation may be as important as specific legal provisions for cooperation). Several DPAs 
informed us that they anticipated the GDPR reforms to act as a driver for more frequent 
cooperation. This differs from our starting assumption that resource issues and the desire to 
avoid duplication of effort in enforcement would be primary drivers for cooperation and 
coordination. 
The GDPR reform process is still ongoing. The first Trialogue sessions have commenced at 
the time of writing. There are ongoing discussions on consistency mechanism, one-stop shop 
and the legal identity, powers and role of the EDPS. There are still things to be decided, and 
there are still things to be worked out in practice. A still pending issue worthy of further 
attention is how practical cooperation required by the GDPR particularly through the 
consistency mechanism, one-stop-shop and the EDPS will be resolved in practice. For 
example, what will become normal practice for concerned DPAs involved in investigations? 
What time limits will be considered acceptable in investigations? It may be the case that these 
norms emerge amongst the community of European DPAs over time, through their 
experience in this type of cooperative activity. The extent to which the GDPR will harmonise 
data protection in the EU is still debated. Some DPAs interviewed expressed opinions that the 
Regulation's provisions would mean European DPAs had equivalent powers and roles, 
reducing the diversity of national implementations of data protection law, in effect creating a 
single regime of data protection. Others instead expressed the belief that there would still 
remain differences in national practice and particularly in both culture and strategy, as well as 
differences in size, resources, experience and economic context in which they were required 
to operate as a regulator. A requirement emerging from this may be the need to better 
understand where there will be remaining differences in areas not covered (and therefore not 
harmonised) by the GDPR.  
Related to this is a practical debate about the extent to which structure and formalisation can 
contribute to more effective cooperation and coordination between European DPAs. For a 
minority of DPAs, the creation of structure systems for information exchange, shared 
complaint handling strategies, templates, forms, alerting systems, etc. were likely to be 
necessary given the scale of cooperation under the GDPR. For another minority, such 
systems were seen as problematic, in that they either reduced the operational flexibility of 
DPAs and their ability to respond to the particular context of a particular case, or they 
believed that agreement on such structures would not be possible given the remaining 
diversity between DPAs, even under the GDPR. For most DPAs structure and formalisation 
could be potentially helpful in various areas, either increasing efficiency, serving as a check 
or reminder for processes, and increasing harmonisation. Many reminded us that structured 
systems would always need to be flexible enough to cope with unanticipated events and 
requirements.  
Key challenges for DPAs include maintaining legitimacy, freedom of action and ability to 
determine their own strategies and methods, and ability to take what they see as appropriate 
measures, whilst maintaining coordination and consistency with their peers. Maintaining 
legitimacy includes concerns about their independence, their relationship to the EDPS and the 
Commission, avoiding reliance on third party tools and networks.  
Language differences remain a key topic of discussion in these interviews, as has previously 
been identified.
22
 Problems raised by language emerged in the interviews in relation to the 
exchange of information, communication systems, requests for assistance, repositories of 
decisions, public communication, and dealing with the one-stop-shop. Whilst DPAs generally 
felt able to communicate with their peers, either with English as a lingua franca or a set of 
commonly used and known European languages, communication with and from the public in 
different countries posed a greater challenge, as did the translation of decisions and legal 
documents in investigations and court cases. Translation imposes resource questions and 
there was uncertainty about the source of the required resources, and who should carry the 
cost. Working in common or shared languages, and making a decision about which to focus 
upon is a highly political issue. Some DPAs looked to the Commission for support in this 
area. The Commission has experience in working across 24 official EU languages and has 
one of the largest translation services in the world.
23
 Further research might understand the 
real extent of this problem in practice, and the number of languages required for effective 
cooperation.  
Tools, (including communication, information exchange, alerting tools and systems for 
structuring requests) were seen as generally useful, but not the limiting factor for cooperation. 
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There are some existing tools (and phone calls, emails, and face-to-face meetings should not 
be discounted in DPA cooperation) even when these have limited technical functionality. 
Tools might be better designed to fit into operational processes, and the area of information 
repositories certainly attracted some support. Like any organisations, DPAs have staff 
turnover, and experience and knowledge that is distributed amongst a peer group can 
potentially be either permanently lost, or temporarily disconnected from that network by 
personnel changes. Repositories for storing this information (decisions, opinions, 
experiences, powers, but also contact information and job responsibilities) and making it 
more easily searchable are desirable. Such repositories also allow for the potential to avoid 
the duplication of information-gathering requests and efforts.  
These interviews suggest there is a community of EU DPAs with sufficient shared 
perspectives that it is possible to talk about an EU DPA perspective, although there are of 
course still differences of focus, position and strategy. This community is collectively and 
individually preparing for changes in the way that it operates due to data protection reform, 
and does have a number of options and pathways open to it. The period following the 
eventual passing of the GDPR is likely to see further working out of these cooperative 
relationships, and the development of further institutionalised measures in response. How 
effective these measures will be is open to further investigation.  
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